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Abstract— There are various undergoing efforts by system 
operators to set up an electricity market at the distribution level 
to enable a rapid and widespread deployment of distributed 
energy resources (DERs) and microgrids. This paper follows the 
previous work of the authors in implementing the distribution 
market operator (DMO) concept, and focuses on investigating 
the clearing and settlement processes performed by the DMO. 
The DMO clears the market to assign the awarded power from 
the wholesale market to customers within its service territory 
based on their associated demand bids. The DMO accordingly 
settles the market to identify the distribution locational marginal 
prices (DLMPs) and calculate payments from each customer 
and the total payment to the system operator. Numerical 
simulations exhibit the merits and effectiveness of the proposed 
DMO clearing and settlement processes.  
Index Terms— distribution market, distribution locational 
marginal price, microgrid, congestion. 
NOMENCLATURE 
a Elements of the bus-line incidence matrix. 
b Load benefit. 
Cc Customer payments to the DMO. 
Cu DMO payment to the ISO. 
CΔ DMO cost surplus.  
f   Superscript for fixed loads.  
g   Index for bid segments. 
m Index for distribution network buses. 
D Load demand.  
PM Total assigned power from the main grid. 
PL Line power flow. 
PLmax     Line power flow limit. 
DX The amount of load awarded to each segment of the 
bid. 
PXmax Maximum capacity of each bid segment. 
r   Superscript for responsive loads (proactive 
customers). 
t             Index for hours. 
λ Transmission locational marginal price (T-LMP). 
λD Distribution locational marginal price (D-LMP). 
 
 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION  
HE GROWING proliferation of proactive electricity 
customers in distribution networks, which respond to 
system behavior by utilizing distributed energy resources 
(DERs) or demand response (DR), provides significant 
benefits for the power system while at the same time 
challenging the system economic and reliable operation [1][2]. 
On one hand, proactive customers can potentially help in 
shaving the peak hours, reducing transmission and distribution 
networks congestion levels, defer capacity upgrades, increase 
reliability by offering a local supply of electricity, and help the 
system in reaching economic objectives and meeting 
environmental mandates [3][4]. These benefits emphasize on 
the critical role of proactive customers in modern power 
systems. On the other hand, the objective of proactive 
customers is primarily to reduce their electricity payments, 
i.e., to increase savings, hence they tend to rely on price-based 
schemes for managing local generation and load resources. In 
simple terms, when the electricity price in the utility grid is 
low the customer would purchase power from the utility grid, 
whereas when the electricity price is high the customer would 
prefer to generate locally, or employ DR, and sell excess 
generation back to the utility grid, or reduce the local load, to 
increase its economic benefits. As price varies during the day, 
the proactive customers’ load profiles will change to ensure 
minimum cost and maximum savings. Although highly 
beneficial for customers, these changes will result in an 
increased level of load uncertainty in the system [5], which 
would accordingly challenge a reliable supply-demand 
balance, increase day-ahead load variations and the need for 
load following and frequency regulation services, and result in 
a sub-optimal resource scheduling solution obtained by the 
system operator. These issues will be more noticeable as the 
number of proactive customers increases in the system. An 
additional issue that should be taken into account is the 
emergence of microgrids in distribution networks [6]. 
Microgrids, as groups of interconnected loads and DERs with 
clearly defined electrical boundaries and the capability to 
operate in the grid-connected and islanded modes, would 
significantly facilitate the integration of DERs as well as the 
T
engagement of DR options in distribution networks by 
offering a coordinate operation and control [7]–[13]. 
Microgrids growing deployment in power systems, i.e., an 
estimated capacity growth from 1.1 GW in 2012 to 4.7 GW in 
2017 [7], can definitely exacerbate the concerns stemmed 
from a large penetration of proactive customers.  
One emerging, and anticipated to be viable, solution to the 
mentioned problems is to manage proactive customers by 
introducing distribution markets that offer the capability  to 
resolve the mentioned challenges by reducing net load 
variability and uncertainty [11]. A few distribution market 
models are currently under investigation in the United States, 
including the Distributed System Platform Provider (DSPP) 
introduced in New York via the Reforming the Energy Vision 
program [14] and Distribution System Operator (DSO) in 
California [15], [16]. Additional studies, although limited, are 
available in the literature including the Distribution Network 
Operator (DNO) model proposed in [17], the DSO model in 
[18], and independent distribution system operator (IDSO) in 
[19]. While different terminology is used to define this 
intermediate entity between the ISO and proactive customers, 
all the proposals share some common characteristics.  
The distribution market operator (DMO) is an entity 
proposed by authors in [11][20] to facilitate the establishment 
of market mechanisms in distribution systems. The DMO, as 
an intermediate entity, communicates with the ISO and 
proactive customers to enable participation of customers in the 
wholesale market. The DMO receives the demand bids from 
customers in the distribution system, aggregates them and 
submits a single aggregated bid to the ISO. After market 
clearing by the ISO, the DMO divides the assigned power 
awarded to it between the participated customers. The DMO 
can be part of the electric utility company or be formed as a 
separate entity. In either case, it should be an independent 
operator so as to guarantee the fairness in market operation. 
The market mechanism is illustrated in Fig. 1 in which the 
financial transactions are performed by the DMO while the 
physical transactions (the actual flow of power from 
generation companies to loads) is performed by the load 
serving entity (LSE).    
The implementation of a distribution market and 
establishment of the DMO offers several advantages for 
customers and the system as a whole: (i) Under distribution 
markets, the microgrid demand is set by the DMO and known 
with certainty on a day-ahead basis, which would enable an 
efficient control of the peak demand, increase operational 
reliability, and improve efficiency; (ii) The microgrid can act 
as a player in the electricity market and exchange power with 
the main grid and other customers. The DMO would facilitate 
microgrids market participation and coordinate the 
microgrids interactions with the main grid to minimize the 
associated operational risks and uncertainties of microgrids; 
(iii) There will be a considerable reduction in the required 
communication infrastructure in the system as the microgrids 
and the ISO only need to communicate with the DMOs. One 
important issue that needs to be taken into account is that the 
DMO can be formed as a new entity or be part of the 
currently existing electric utilities. An independent DMO 
would be able to set up a universal market environment 
instead of one for each utility. It would also be less suspected 
of exercising market power. On the other hand, a utility-
affiliated DMO would be able to perform several 
functionalities currently possessed by electric utilities without 
necessitating additional investments. Considering the listed 
advantages, and many more that will be obtained using more 
detailed numerical simulations in future work, distribution 
markets can be considered as both beneficial and necessary 
components in modern power grids which will help 
accommodate a large penetration of active customers. 
Therefore, identifying the detailed operation of these new 
entities, along with efficient modeling of market clearing and 
settlement, is of ultimate importance, as focused on in this 
paper.  
 Fig. 1 Market mechanism in presence of DMO 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The 
formulation for the proposed DMO market clearing is 
presented in Section II. The price-based market clearing is 
explained in section III. Settlement is demonstrated in section 
IV. Numerical results are presented in section V. The paper is 
concluded in section VI. 
II. DISTRIBUTION MARKET CLEARING  
Proactive customers in the distribution system offer their 
demand bid to the DMO. A typical bid consisting of three 
segments is depicted in Fig. 2. The DMO combines the 
individual bids and sends an aggregated bid to the ISO to be 
considered in the wholesale market. Once the ISO receives 
load bids (from DMOs) and generation bids (from GENCOs) 
it solves the security-constrained unit commitment and 
economic dispatch problems to determine the optimal unit and 
load schedules as well as locational marginal prices in the 
transmission level (T-LMP). The obtained schedule and prices 
are accordingly announced to DMOs and GENCOs. Each 
DMO would need to divide this assigned power among 
proactive customers in its service territory, i.e., it would 
“clear” the distribution market.  
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 Fig. 2 Demand bid curve for customer at bus i with a three-segment bid 
In doing so, the DMO seeks to maximize the distribution 
network social welfare, i.e., load benefits minus generation 
cost (which is the cost of assigned power from the main grid), 
as proposed in (1). 
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The power balance at each bus is ensured by (2) in which 
the power injected to each bus from connected lines is equal 
to the summation of loads from passive and proactive 
customers. The power balance at the bus connecting the 
distribution network to the upstream transmission network is 
ensured by (3) in which the power transferred by the main 
grid is distributed among lines connected to this bus (here the 
bus number 0). The load of passive customers will be 
constant, while that of proactive customers is variable and 
defined by (4). The scheduled load of proactive customers is 
determined based on the scheduled power consumption in 
each bud segment, in which each segment is limited by its 
associated maximum capacity (5). Line power flows are 
limited by the line capacity limits (6). Since the distribution 
network is considered to be radial, a viable distribution power 
flow can be guaranteed by simultaneously considering (2), 
(4), and (5).  
The proposed market clearing model can be solved based 
on two completely different assumption which are based on 
the market design: constant power and variable power, as 
discussed in the following:  
A. Constant Power Clearing  
The quantity of the power assigned by the ISO to the DMO 
is determined via the wholesale market clearing and 
announced to the DMO, hence it is constant. The LMP at the 
distribution bus is also determined by the ISO, thus the 
second term in (1) is constant and can be omitted from the 
proposed model. In this case, the DMO would distribute the 
assigned power to proactive customers via the proposed 
market clearing model. One issue that needs to be considered 
here is that the T-LMP does not appear in the optimization 
problem, hence the calculated distribution locational marginal 
prices (D-LMPs) can be potentially different from the T-
LMP.  
B. Variable Power Clearing  
In this case the DMO will schedule distribution resources 
based on the T-LMP determined by the ISO, however, it can 
deviate from the assigned power, i.e., it can purchase variable 
amount of power from the main grid. Therefore in the 
objective function (1), the main grid power PtM is considered a 
variable whose value is to be determined in the optimization 
problem, rather than a parameter set by the ISO and given as a 
fixed value to the DMO. The variable power clearing model 
has been discussed in the literature [21][22]. Although 
straight-forward and easy to implement, as it utilizes the same 
model as ISO uses for the wholesale market clearing, this 
model bring about the risk of causing new peaks in the grid. 
When the prices are low, all customers would tend to purchase 
more power than they would have purchased if the prices were 
lower, and this would create a shortage of power. On the other 
hand, if the prices are too high, the customers would tend to 
use their own local generation to supply their load, hence 
creating a potential surplus. All these possible responses result 
in market uncertainties, hence reducing the benefits of 
implementing a distribution market. 
III. DISTRIBUTION MARKET SETTLEMENT 
The DMO determines the D-LMPs for each distribution 
bus in each operation time period as a byproduct of the market 
clearing process. The D-LMP in each bus is calculated as the 
dual variable of the power balance equation in that bus (2). 
Using D-LMPs the market can be settled, i.e., the payments 
from customers and the payments to the main grid can be 
determined. The payment of each customer is calculated as the 
D-LMP times the associated load. The total customer 
payments is the summation of all payments as proposed in (7), 
in which Dmt includes both passive and proactive customers’ 
loads. The payment to the utility is calculated as the T-LMP 
times the assigned power by the ISO (8). Since losses are 
ignored in the proposed market clearing model, the sum of the 
distribution loads will be equal to the total power assigned by 
the ISO (9).  
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Considering the payments, the DMO cost surplus can be 
calculated as the difference between the two calculated 
payments as in (10): 
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The obtained CΔ can be negative, positive, or zero, based 
on the calculated payments. The existing DMO proposals 
currently lack the required  mechanisms, similar to what exists 
for the ISOs (such as auction revenue right and financial 
transmission right mechanisms) [23], to ensure that the cost 
surplus will reach zero by efficiently distributing the surplus 
earning to customers. This issue can potentially be a major 
concern regarding the fairness of the DMOs which is worthy 
of further investigation.  
IV. NUMERICAL SIMULATION  
The IEEE 13-bus test system [24] in used to investigate the 
viability and the merits of the proposed distribution market 
clearing and settlement processes. Fig. 3 depicts this system in 
which proactive customers are located at buses 2, 3, 5-7, and 
10- 13. 
 Fig. 3 IEEE 13-bus standard test system. 
 
Three cases are considered: Case 1: Variable power 
market clearing and settlement; Case 2: Constant power 
market clearing and settlement ignoring line flow limits; and 
Case 3: Constant power market clearing and settlement 
considering line flow limits.  
Case 1: Fig. 4 shows the hourly average D-LMP and the 
hourly T-LMP at the point of connection to the main grid. As 
shown, the D-LMPs are higher than the T-LMP in most of the 
hours, which is a result of the congestion in lines 5-6 and 8-7. 
As the prices increase, there will be a reduction in the amount 
of power purchased from the main grid, hence the congestion 
will be eliminated, and accordingly, D-LMPs and the T-LMP 
become equivalent. This situation happens in hours 2, 13, 14, 
and 16. In this case, the DMO receives $2034 from customers 
while paying $1900 to the ISO. The cost surplus of $134 is 
due to the congestion in the distribution network which needs 
to be distributed among customers.  
Case 2: Fig. 5 depicts an example profile of the power 
assigned to the DMO via the wholesale market. The D-LMPs 
are determined via the distribution market clearing with 
constant power and based on the load bids submitted by 
proactive customers as $0.355/MWh. Using the given power 
profile, no lines are congested (resulting in equal D-LMP in 
all buses), the load payment is calculated as $2148, and the 
payment to the main grid is calculated as $2046 ($102 
surplus).   
 Fig. 4 LMP at the bus connected to high voltage system (T-LMP), and 
average of LMP at distribution system busses (D-LMPs). 
 Fig. 5 The schedule of power assigned to the DMO over the 24-hour horizon. 
 
 Fig. 6 Average D-LMP across the distribution network buses as a function of 
total assigned power. 
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Case 3: Fig. 6 shows that the average D-LMPs in the 
distribution network decrease as the amount of assigned power 
increases. Customers located at buses 10 and 13 are offering 
higher bids to purchase power. When line 4-9 becomes 
congested, the loads awarded to those customers decrease and 
since the bid is monotonically decreasing, as shown in Fig. 2, 
the prices at those buses increase. D-LMPs at buses upstream 
this line similarly decrease, as they will be awarded more 
power. Table I lists the average D-LMPs at distribution buses 
over the 24 hour horizon in this case. Lines 5-6 and 4-9 are 
congested, thus D-LMPs at buses downstream these lines (i.e., 
buses 6-13) have increased. 
TABLE I  
AVERAGE D-LMPS AT DISTRIBUTION BUSES  
Bus 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Price 0.278 0.278 0.278 0.278 0.353 0.373 0.373 0.373 0.373 0.373 0.373 0.373  
When the power assigned to the DMO is similar to Fig. 5, 
the customers’ payment to the DMO is $2134 and the 
payment to the ISO is $2046 ($88 surplus). If the assigned 
power is increased by 10%, the customers’ payment to the 
DMO will be $2209, and the payment to the ISO will be 
$2250 ($41 surplus). This result advocates that the payment to 
the DMO under constant power clearing model is subject to 
the amount of assigned power, and independent from the T-
LMP. The DMO cost surplus also can considerably change as 
the assigned power changes.  
V. CONCLUSION 
The DMO operation was investigated in this paper in 
which the distribution market clearing and settlement models 
were proposed and formulated. Two approaches for 
distribution market clearing were discussed, including the 
constant power clearing and the variable power clearing. 
Although the variable power clearing model has been 
discussed in the literature, it was shown that this model can 
potentially cause variability and uncertainty in the load 
managed by the DMO. The constant power clearing model, on 
the other hand, solved this issue while bringing a potential 
drawback since the total payment by customers could become 
larger than the payment to the ISO. Both issues, however, 
require additional investigations as discussed and signified in 
this paper.  
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